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1.

Introduction

For most countries, competition law is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1950, only ten
jurisdictions had competition laws. Today more than 120 jurisdictions do and more than 80 of
these systems have commenced since 1980.1 Officials from these jurisdictions now interact
regularly through networked organizations, such as the International Competition Network
(ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). There is no binding
multilateral treaty mandating that countries have a competition law system that prescribes
certain behavior, or create specialized institutions to enforce these prescriptions, although the
North American Free Trade Agreement and a number of other free trade agreements signed by
the United States (US) have short provisions that require countries to adopt and enforce laws
against anticompetitive business conduct. Yet such prescriptions and institutions now exist in all
major economies, creating what can be viewed as a transnational legal order, a collection of
formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the
understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions.2
Combating international cartels is one of the central goals of this transnational legal
order, and there appears to be greater normative convergence on this antitrust issue than any
other among governments. Countries around the world have increased sanctions against cartels,
including in many cases adopting criminal sanctions for the first time, with the term cartels now
commonly harnessed to the unsavory epithet ‘hard core’ to signify cartels engaged in price
fixing, output limitations, market divisions and bid-rigging.3 More than thirty countries have
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criminalized cartel conduct in some form. All but five have done so since 1995 and over twenty
since 2000, and the list is growing.4 Many states have initiated prosecutions, several have
secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time for these offenses. Others are significantly
increasing the amount of fines for cartel behavior, such that they can be viewed in punitive
terms, whether they are formally of a criminal or administrative law nature. Around sixty
countries now combine enhanced sanctions with a leniency program pursuant to which the first
to confess is immunized from public criminal or civil prosecution, adopting a carrot and stick
approach to destabilizing and deterring cartels.
There is, in short, a global trend toward enhanced sanctions combined with common
enforcement techniques. Former US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal
Enforcement, Scott Hammond thus proclaimed, ‘[i]n the last two decades, the world has seen the
proliferation of effective leniency programs, ever-increasing sanctions for cartel offenses, a
growing global movement to hold individuals criminally accountable, and increased international
cooperation among enforcers in cartel investigations.’5 Although the US remains the primary
user of criminal law as an enforcement tool, and the enforcement record outside the US is
relatively slim, the debate over criminalization is active.6 This debate reflects a general shift in
government attitudes toward cartels which earlier were viewed in more benign (or even positive
developmental) terms, since cartels could contribute to price stability and labor peace on account
of the long-term employment that stable firms with ensured profit margins can offer.7
This state of affairs raises a series of questions. What spurred the trend toward increased
sanctioning and criminalization of cartel activity? Has the move been almost entirely driven by
criminalization evangelists such as the US Department of Justice (DOJ), working unilaterally,
bilaterally, and through transnational networks? Is the primary explanation cognitive in terms of
shared norms of being a ‘modern’ regulatory capitalist state, as stressed by global polity theory?8
Or does the shift simply reflect a rational response to the rise of international cartels operating in
more than one jurisdiction as part of economic globalization? In other words, is the trend toward
criminalization a functional response to regulatory difficulties that transcend national borders in
an economically interdependent world, as rational institutionalist theory stresses? Or are organic,
bottom-up, national processes also at work? Are we witnessing a change in ideological and
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moral sensibilities around the globe regarding cartel conduct? What is the impact of formal legal
change on actual practices within countries, both in terms of government investigations and
private behavior? What are the mechanisms driving the criminalization of cartel activity and the
enforcement of anti-cartel policies, and what are the primary obstacles to change? What, in sum,
does the criminalization trend tell us about transnational legal processes and their limits?9
This Chapter reviews and assesses trends in the criminalization and enforcement of cartel
offenses around the world, highlighting their notable features. It notes the change in focus in the
US toward addressing international cartels in the 1990s, followed by a shift in focus toward
criminal penalties, including jail time for foreign individuals. The US has advocated these
changes in international fora, most notably the OECD and the ICN. It has been relatively
successful in its efforts to convince countries to enhance sanctions against cartel activity, and to
use new enforcement tools such as leniency programs. We thus note the role of US advocacy in
these developments. Yet we do not attempt to answer whether the change is rational interestbased or cognitive, since we find that there is support for both explanations.10 Rather, we focus
on developments in formal law compared to actual enforcement, the mechanism of diffusion
through networks, and the challenges posed for formal criminalization policies to be applied.
Criminalizing competition offenses and actually enforcing those prohibitions are two different
propositions.
Part 2 addresses changes in the law—the ‘law on the books’—in a number of
jurisdictions, starting with the US and the European Union (EU). It highlights the enactment
around the globe of increasingly severe penalties against cartel activity, and the increased
adoption of criminal sanctions, which follows the US lead. Part 3 examines enforcement trends
in the US, the EU, and other countries, starting with the increased focus of US enforcement
policy on international cartels and on the application of criminal sanctions against individuals.
Part 4 addresses transnational cooperation efforts in combating cartels, focusing particularly on
the role of the US-initiated ICN, as well as the ongoing substantive and peer-review work of the
OECD. Part 5 examines two new developments regarding enforcement techniques, the enhanced
threat of extradition for cartel activity on account of mutual criminalization, and the proliferation
of leniency programs to destabilize cartels, which are used as a carrot to complement the stick of
more severe sanctions. Part 6 addresses the central impediments to these trends, and in particular
the challenge of obtaining sufficient social and political support for criminalizing cartel activity
and the impact of different institutional legacies, especially where criminal and competition law
responsibilities are divided among different authorities.
2.

Legal change across countries: the law on the books

2.1

Overview of policy developments

While twenty years ago cartel prosecutions were largely the province of the US DOJ, a
broad range of countries have now adopted enhanced sanctions against cartel offenses, including

9
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criminal sanctions now being available in over thirty countries. Around thirty-five countries have
criminalized cartel conduct in some form; most of them since the mid-1990s, and the list is
growing. We compile these countries as of the end of 2012 in Table 1 at the end of this chapter,
noting the date of criminalization, the conduct covered, and the sanctions provided. We also
highlight those countries that appear to be more serious about criminal prosecution in practice,
although in many cases we do not yet know how sanctions will be applied because of the novelty
of the legal trend.
The leader in the move toward enhancing sanctions against cartels has been the US, now
joined by the EU. Although the EU itself applies only administrative fines to undertakings and
not individuals, these fines are punitive enough that EU Advocates-General view them as ‘quasicriminal,’ and over half of the EU member states have criminalized at least some forms of cartel
activity. More recently, other OECD countries have followed suit, as have the BRICS—Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa. As John Connor writes, ‘with the adoption of an antitrust
law in China in 2007, virtually all the world’s leading economies have made cartels illegal.’11
Whereas cartel activity earlier was not viewed as problematic, and seen as possibly even
conducive, to national economic development, most leading economies have now significantly
stiffened sanctions against cartels, reflecting a sense of social opprobrium, at least in the books.
The trend toward punitive administrative sanctions has facilitated the move toward criminal
sanctions as an enhanced deterrent.
Yet scholarly attempts to assess global patterns of criminalization are limited.12
Christopher Harding rightly notes that any such attempt will necessarily be plagued by problems
of definition and legislative complexity.13 Some systems, for example, prosecute cartel offenses
as both administrative and criminal offenses. It thus may be difficult as a practical matter to
disentangle administrative fines and surcharges from ‘criminal fines.’ The growing trend toward
‘criminalization’ (broadly construed) also masks crucial differences between jurisdictions.
Harding concludes that empirical study reveals ‘very much a patchwork of criminalization’
involving local legal traits.14 Apart from Canada and the US, little of other countries’ ‘criminal
legislation pre-dates the 1980s, and much of it has a more partial or tentative character.’15 For
example, criminal sanctions can be imposed for bid-rigging in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
and Poland, but such conduct can be viewed as more akin to fraud and thus distinct (for such
jurisdictions) from that of cartel offenses. In some jurisdictions, only criminal fines may be
imposed, and in many others, only fines are used in practice, so that they lack the social sanction
and potential deterrence value of jail time. Canada, for example, prosecutes individuals, but even
where successful, the individuals typically only receive a conditional sentence pursuant to which
they provide community service.16 While European, Latin American, and Asian jurisdictions
have all criminalized competition offenses, ‘there is no systematic pattern.’17
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Criminalization of cartel conduct is of a recent vintage, and more limited in scope,
outside the US.18 Harding identified only nine countries in 2006 that are ‘to some extent selfconsciously targeting cartel activity by means of criminal law within the context of the recent
international campaign against cartels,’ listing Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan,
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the US.19 This figure, however, has increased since then. An
October 2010 Cartels Workshop organized by the ICN placed the figure at more than twenty
countries,20 we show that the figure was more than thirty in 2012, and the list is growing.
2.2

US Developments

The US has long been the global leader in aggressively pursuing competition policy.21
The US first extended the jurisdictional reach of its law to combat foreign-based cartels. As this
move was insufficient, the US has since attempted to export anti-cartel policies and enforcement
techniques abroad, in particular through the OECD and the ICN discussed in Part 4.
The US has criminalized agreements and conspiracies to restrict competition since 1890
with the passage of the original Sherman Antitrust Act, although it would be over seventy years
before jail sentences for antitrust violations became common.22 Originally only a misdemeanor,
violation of the Act became a felony in 1974. The US subjects both corporations and individuals
to punishment, casting ‘[t]he net … widely in terms of both conduct and persons.’23 Cartel
participants face large fines, possible imprisonment, and treble damages in civil actions. The
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 significantly increased the
maximum penalties for antitrust offenses.24 The Act increased the maximum corporate fine from
$10 million to $100 million; increased the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to $1
million; and raised the maximum jail sentence from three to ten years. The longest prison
sentence for an individual to date has been sixty months.25 If the top end of the range applicable
under the US Sentencing Guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum, then an alternative
sentencing provision available for federal felonies may be employed which can increase fines to
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twice the amount of harm caused or the gains derived.26 The DOJ routinely invokes this
provision to justify fines in excess of the statutory maximum. The largest criminal fine under this
provision has been $500 million.27
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ relies heavily on its amnesty and leniency program in
its criminal enforcement efforts.28 The amnesty program grants automatic immunity from
criminal prosecution if an entity or individual reports illegal conduct which the Antitrust
Division was not previously aware of and truthfully cooperates with the Division in its
investigation and any resulting prosecution. The cooperating entity must further not have been
the ringleader of the cartel nor have coerced others to participate. Discretionary immunity or
reduced sentences and fines are available to entities and individual who cannot meet the full
criteria set forth above. To further induce cartel offenders to come forward, recent legislation
also amended the leniency program to limit the civil damages exposure of an amnesty applicant
from treble damages to the actual damages caused, in addition to providing immunity from
criminal prosecution.
2.3

EU and EU Member State Developments

Historically, Europe has approached antitrust regulation very differently than the US.
While the US approach has been characterized by criminalization and treble damage civil claims,
Europe’s approach had long been administrative, involving a more consensual process which
was often based on voluntary adoption of practices, and which avoided penal sanctions and
critical language suggesting moral approbation.29 Europe’s approach began to change in the early
1980s, and has since become increasingly ‘American’ in its tough-minded approach toward
cartels, focusing on their adverse economic impact on consumers.30 Although EU authorities are
still unable to impose prison terms or fine individuals for antitrust violations, and there are
significant constitutional and institutional limitations on their ability to do so, they have become
much more aggressive in anti-cartel enforcement and there is now a debate as to the advisability
of adding a criminal law component to EU competition policy.31
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The EU has significantly increased its penalties for cartel offenses in recent years to the
extent that EU Advocate-Generals have called them ‘quasi-criminal.’32 EU authorities now can
assess fines up to 30% of a company’s annual sales in connection with the prohibited activities
multiplied by the number of years in which the offenses occurred. Fines also now include an
‘entry fee’—or automatic fixed penalty—of between 15-25% of the participant’s annual sales in
the affected sector.33 While the fines do not change the maximum penalty – 10 per cent of a
company’s total turnover in the preceding business year (whether or not in connection with the
prohibited activity – the revisions make it more likely that the fines will approach that limit.34
Among the more significant developments in the EU are the refinement of its leniency program
in 2006 and the establishment of its cartel settlement procedure in June 2008, in both cases
following the US lead.35 The leniency program, unlike the US model, is not backed by the threat
of criminal sanction. Yet the program has proven crucial to uncovering cartels in Europe, with
the majority of cases in recent years stemming from evidence obtained from a leniency
applicant.36 The settlement procedure is designed to streamline the EU’s handling of cartel cases
and thus free resources for new investigations. The alleged cartelist is able to review the EU’s
evidence against it and determine whether to acknowledge its involvement and accept liability
for violations of EU competition law in EU territory. Cooperating parties receive an automatic
10% reduction in penalties pursuant to the settlement program, but can obtain full immunity if
they are the first to confess pursuant to the leniency program.
The European Commission, through its Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp),
and EU national competition authorities established the European Competition Network (ECN)
in 2004 to increase cooperation between EU and national authorities, and more effectively share
enforcement tasks.37 The underlying regulation also strengthened authorities’ investigatory
powers by, for example, establishing their right to seal business premises and books or records,
and to interview persons who may have useful information.38 The ECN has helped competition
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[1991] ECR II-867, 3: referring to the ‘substance of the [competition] cases, which all broadly exhibit the
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involved, Philip Marsden, ‘Checks and Balances: EU Competition Law and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 22 Loyola
Consumer Law Review 51, 55.
33
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Of Regulation No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C210 2.
34
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35
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36
See Edmond noting that all cases adopted in 2010 were via immunity applications: Charlotte Edmond, ‘For
Whom the Whistle Blows’ (Legal Week 22 Sept 2011). See also Alan Riley, ‘The Modernisation of EU AntiCartel Enforcement: Will the Commission Grasp the Opportunity?’ (Special Report, Center for European Policy
Studies January 2010) 5 <http://aei.pitt.edu/14570/1/Modernisation_Final_e-version.pdf.>.
37
Stephen Wilks, ‘The European Competition Network: what has changed?’ (Paper for EUSA Conference,
Montreal, 17-19 May 2007) <http://aei.pitt.edu/8067/1/wilks%2Ds%2D08h.pdf>.
38
See Chavez (n 16) 964–65. See also Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 On the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, arts. 19, 20, [2003] OJ L 1, 14-15.
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policy gain stature throughout the EU, and enhanced the authority of the DG Comp and the
National Competition Authorities.39
The major focus of sanctions for EU member state authorities likewise is the imposition
of administrative fines against corporate enterprises, embedded in a juridical framework.40
Starting in the late 1990s, and increasing more recently, however, some EU member states have
begun to embark on a criminalization project. Over half of the EU member states now
criminalize certain cartel offenses, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
and the United Kingdom, and the list appears to be growing, although Austria, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg have decriminalized competition law (except for bid-rigging in Austria).41 As
discussed in Part 3, however, how such criminalization initiatives will operate in practice
remains in question as the policies remain circumscribed compared to the US model.
2.4

Developments in other Countries

In recent years, a wide range of other jurisdictions, at least formally, provide jail time for
cartel offenses. Individuals now face potential imprisonment for cartel activity in Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, Thailand, and Zambia,
in addition to in the US and a majority of EU member states. Moreover, cartel participants are
subject to complementary private civil damage actions in a growing number of countries,
including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, as well as in Belgium, Germany,
Ireland, and the United Kingdom within the European Union.
The global trend is toward providing for enhanced sanctions against cartels. Many OECD
members (in addition to the US and EU member states) have stiffened penalties for engaging in
cartel activities, which vary in their civil/administrative or criminal law nature. For example,
Canada’s Budget Implementation Act of 2009 substantially changed the criminal enforcement
regime for cartel offenses by raising the maximum penalty from 5 to 14 years in prison and the
maximum fine from $10 to $25 million. Price-fixing, market allocation, and output restrictions
are now per se offenses under the law.42 And as of early 2012, an individual convicted and
sentenced to prison under certain provisions of the act no longer enjoys the prospect of serving
his or her sentence in the community.43 Australia recently increased maximum fines to the

39

Gerber (n 7) 190, 200.
Ibid 182. In addition the European Union has issued a directive requiring member states to enact effective private
damage remedies for competition violations into national law by the end of 2016. DIRECTIVE 2014/104/EU OF
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalStates
and
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the
European
Union,
available
at
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104&from=EN.
41
Stating that more than half of all EU member states have some form of criminal sanctions for some forms of cartel
conduct: Philipp Girardet, ‘“What if Uncle Sam wants you?”: Principles and Recent Practice Concerning US
Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases’ (2010) 1 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 286, 287;
Wouter Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer’ in Cseres and Others (n 33) 60, 74.
42
Spratling and Arp (n 36) 250; Bill C-10, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on 27 January, 2009 and related to fiscal measures, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009 [hereinafter Bill C-10].
Bill C-10 became S.C. 2009, c. 2 upon passage through Parliament.
43
Elisa Kearney and others, ‘Canadian Government Restricts Availability of Conditional Sentences (“House
Arrest”)’ Mondaq (20 March 2012)
40
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greater of $10 million or three times the value of the benefit derived from the cartel. Where value
cannot be determined, the law provides for a fine of 10% of annual turnover.44 In 2009, the
Australian Parliament criminalized various cartel offenses, providing for up to 10 years in prison
and a fine of $220,000 (Aus), and New Zealand is in the process of following Australia in this
respect.45 In the summer of 2009, Japan increased criminal sanctions for cartel offenses,
changing its maximum prison sentence for cartel conduct or bid-rigging from three to five years.
Japan also raised the statute of limitations from three to five years, and restructured its new
leniency program.46 In 2005, Korea likewise revised its competition laws to increase fines
against cartel participants from a maximum of 5% to a maximum of 10% of sales in related
goods or services, and to facilitate use of a leniency program.47 More recently, in 2011, Mexico’s
Congress approved a new law introducing criminal sanctions of up to ten years in prison for
collusion, as well as the ability to engage in surprise inspections, known as ‘dawn raids.’48 Even
Switzerland, ‘where cartels were “endemic” to the economy,’ has recently passed a law
providing for administrative fines of up to 10% of a firm’s total combined revenue for the
preceding three years.49
The BRIC countries have also stiffened penalties for engaging in cartel activities. Brazil
has emerged as the new leader in Latin America in combating cartels. Since 2003, Brazil’s
competition system has eliminated overlapping functions, streamlined cartel investigations, and
enhanced authorities’ enforcement tools through granting them the power to conduct ‘dawn
raids’ and to use the leverage provided by new leniency and settlement programs.50 Federal and
state prosecutors conduct cartel prosecutions, in cooperation with the agencies forming part of
the Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS).51 The BCPS’s anti-cartel program has grown
steadily, especially since 2006.52 Brazil’s program for criminally prosecuting cartels is recently
among ‘the most active of all countries,’ and includes fines and prison sentences ranging from
two to five years.53 Brazil’s leniency program, created in 2000, offers full immunity to the first
cartelist to confess, or partial immunity where enforcers were already aware of the cartel. Brazil

<http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/169312/Antitrust+Competition/Canadian+Government+Restricts+Availabilit
y>.
44
Spratling and Arp (n 36) 243.
45
A bill imposing criminal sanctions for cartel behavior was introduced into parliament in October 2011. Commerce
(Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, 2011 No. 341-1, Digest No. 1942 (Oct. 13, 2011)
<http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/C9A80483-8096-4CCF-941CE2B346E6C844/208630/1942Commerce1.pdf >: criminalizing price fixing, output restrictions, market allocation
and bid rigging, and providing criminal penalties of, inter alia, up to seven years imprisonment for an individual.
See also Chavez (n 16) 965–66; Ministry of Economic Development, ‘New Zealand, Cartel Criminalisation
Discussion Document’ (Ministry of Economic Development (NZ) 2010)
<http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/70683/Cartel-Criminalisation.pdf.>.
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also introduced a Cartel Settlement Program under which competition authorities enter into
settlements with companies that lost the race to apply for leniency. The settlement program led to
a number of settlements since 2007.54 Brazil has emerged as a regional expert in anti-cartel
enforcement—having recently shared its growing expertise with Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and
El Salvador.55 Brazil’s competition authorities regularly engage in bilateral training and
consultations with other national authorities.
Among the other BRICs, China’s new anti-monopoly law went into effect in 2008, and in
the summer of 2009, China’s industry and commerce agency announced new procedures
governing antitrust investigations and enforcement.56 China’s Anti-Monopoly Law does not
expressly provide for criminal penalties, but other criminal law provisions can and have been
used against cartel participants (such as for ‘obstruction’ of justice).57 Similarly, under a law
effective in late 2009, Russia now applies criminal sanctions for antitrust violations, and certain
offenses are punishable by up to six years imprisonment.58 In India, ‘after a long and troubled
gestation,’59 a new competition act began to take effect in 2009 which stiffens sanctions,
including fines of up to 10 percent of an enterprise’s turnover,60 and prison terms for obstruction
of justice.61 Sometimes associated as one of the expanded ‘BRICS,’ South Africa also in 2009
enacted criminal liability for directors and managers for certain competition law offenses,62 and
has now created a cartel division within its enforcement agency.63 The impact of these legal
changes, however, remains an open question in many countries for the reasons we discuss in Part
6.
3.

Enforcement trends across countries

3.1

Overview of policy developments

The prevalence of cartels is difficult to measure. Conspiracies are meant to go
undetected, and many, of course, do. Yet because of more robust law enforcement tools and
shifting attitudes about cartels, authorities are detecting more cartels than in the past. While
many countries have law on the books, to what extent do different jurisdictions effectively
enforce those laws? Answering this question is difficult. As Harding observed, it is still too early
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to assess the impact of ‘the enforcement of criminal law relating to cartels, when so much of this
is of recent origin,’ but ‘some indications at a more general and comparative level [suggest] that
implementation and enforcement [do] not match the rhetoric of law enactment.’64
Scholars and policymakers have attempted to get at the enforcement question in different
ways. Economist John Connor has collected empirical data on enforcement in a large multijurisdictional sample.65 The ICN and OECD offer survey evidence regarding the perspectives of
cartel authorities.66 Critically, however, empirical work on cartel enforcement can measure only
detected cartels. One must therefore bear in mind that any conclusions drawing from this
empirical work inevitably suffer from selection bias. Methodological difficulties
notwithstanding, the overall global trend is toward enhanced enforcement, including higher fines
and an increased emphasis on individual accountability with a view toward deterrence, although
the level of enforcement varies significantly by jurisdiction as does its deterrent value.
Connor undertook, to our knowledge, the first attempt to assess quantitatively, using a
large multi-jurisdictional sample, the magnitude and pattern of global antitrust sanctions imposed
against ‘international cartels,’ by which he refers to cartels involving members from more than
one country.67 Connor presents data on such cartels discovered from 1990–2005 in a 2006 study,
and maintains an annually-updated database of all publicly reported sanctions. He selects 1990 as
a date that roughly captures the beginning of the current level of sanctions and the harmonization
of antitrust laws among the US, EU, and Canada. From 1990 to 2005, authorities took a total of
387 legal actions against 260 international cartels. Legal action includes ‘the launching of an
official investigation, the filing of a private antitrust damages suit, or the imposition of one or
more legal sanctions.’68 The US, Europe, and Canada commenced the vast majority of these
legal actions—128, 101 (including action by both EU member states and the EU) and 56,
respectively. In contrast, only seventeen actions were initiated in Asia, and only two in Latin
America, against international cartels during this period. Authorities secured a total of 285
‘convictions’ in these cases, which Connor defines to include consent decrees, settlement
agreements, and warnings. He concludes that the data suggests that ‘antitrust authorities are by
and large cautious about opening formal investigations in the sense that 90–95% of the cases
investigated conclude with sanctions of some sort.’69
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More recently, Connor updates and summarizes the data through 2008 with a view to
uncovering trends across countries over time.70 Between January 1990 and November 2008, he
finds that there were 516 ‘formal official investigations’ of suspected international cartels around
the world, meaning that there were 129 new formal investigations (516-387) between 2005 and
2008 alone.71 This figure regarding ‘investigations’ includes cartels that were subject to raids,
grand jury hearings, class actions, and indictments. At least 6,000 companies have been alleged
or proven to be members of international cartels, including about 2,900 ultimate parent
companies with known names and locations. At least 1,620 corporations have been fined.72
These cartels alone affected a total of around $16 trillion in sales, with the largest number trading
in industrial goods, followed by business and consumer services.73 Connor finds that the trend
across countries toward increased discovery of international cartels is pronounced, with rates of
discovery being fifteen times higher in 2005–2008 than before 1994, and having steadily
increased between those dates.74
Enforcement patterns vary widely among states and regions. The number of indictments
in the US and Canada peaked in the late 1990s, although this shift could suggest that past
enforcement efforts and the use of criminal sanctions have been successful deterrents. At the
same time, the severity of applied US sanctions has increased.75 In parallel, the EU has
commenced an increasingly large number of cases, resulting in increasingly high sanctions.
National competition authorities within the EU have been the biggest prosecutors of international
cartels since 2000, and collectively they surpass all other agencies in terms of the number of
international cartels uncovered.76 Other regions have also engaged in increased cartel
enforcement, although cartel detections in Africa, Asia and Latin America are comparatively
modest.77
Total global penalties assessed against international cartels from 1990 to 2008 are
approximately $63.3 billion.78 Government fines account for more than half of this total ($35
billion), though private settlements stemming from civil suits (particularly from the US) are also
significant, totaling approximately $29 billion.79 The European Commission has imposed the
vast bulk of global fines, followed by national competition authorities within the EU, the US
DOJ, and US state Attorneys General.80 Far behind the US and EU, Korea leads the rest of the
world in terms of fines imposed (with approximately $750 million), followed by Africa (less
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than $500 million), Latin America (approximately $300 million), other Asian countries, and
Oceania, each with less than half of the Latin American total.81
Individuals increasingly risk being held accountable, especially in the US.82 At least 435
individual executives have been penalized, and 989 charged worldwide as of December 2008.83
Americans account for nearly one third of all penalized executives.84 Although the number of
individuals charged in the US fluctuated between 1990–2008, the likelihood of sentences has
become greater and the amount of fines and length of prison sentences have become increasingly
severe since 1990.85 The US however, remains ‘almost unique’ when it comes to prison
sentences: only Israel is another significant jurisdiction in that respect, followed by Japan.86
3.2

US Developments

The US has historically taken the global lead in cartel enforcement. In the last two
decades, it has done so regarding international cartels and has increasingly focused on criminal
sanctions since the late 1990s, including incarceration of foreign defendants.87 The US reports
that it has imposed more than 90% of fines in the past few years in connection with the
prosecution of international cartel activity.88
The result has been increasing US prosecution of foreign defendants. Connor’s data
shows that in the US, ‘prior to 1995, less than 2% of corporations accused of criminal price
fixing were foreign-based firms; after 1997, more than 50% were non-US corporations.’89 The
DOJ is typically investigating about fifty international cartels at any one time.90 Total annual
criminal fines increased dramatically starting in 1997, with a record of $1.1 billion in FY 1999.91
Total criminal fines again exceeded $1 billion in 2009 and 2012.92 Though the DOJ does not
target particular geographic regions or industry sectors, recent years have seen particularly robust
enforcement against Asian corporations. Since 2005, the DOJ has imposed cartel fines of $10
million or greater on more companies headquartered in Asia than on those headquartered in
every other country combined.93
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ emphasizes ‘that the most effective way to deter and
punish cartel activity is to hold culpable individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences.’94 As
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one US official states, ‘our defendants routinely offer to pay large fines in lieu of going to jail, a
plea that we reject, but they don’t offer to go to jail in lieu of paying a large fine.’95 Connor
reports that the DOJ secured prison sentences for a total of 284 individuals in cartel cases from
1990–2007, of which an increasing number and proportion are foreigners.96 Since May 1999,
nearly fifty foreign defendants have served or are serving prison sentences in the US for
international cartel offenses or obstructing a cartel investigation.97 The percentage of defendants
sentenced to jail in cartel cases, and the number of individuals per corporate defendant, have
increased. The 1990s saw an average of 37% of defendants involve a jail sentence, whereas the
2009 average was 80%.98 Sentences are also getting harsher.99 The DOJ achieved its highest
average jail sentence for all defendants in fiscal year 2007, with an average sentence of thirtyone months. That same year, it imposed a record of 31,391 total jail days against individuals,
mostly pursuant to guilty pleas.100
3.3

The Vitamins Cases and their Impact

In the late 1990s, the US took the lead in a landmark case that had a significant impact on
global anti-cartel practices. The ensuing cases in multiple jurisdictions illustrated the potentially
grave consequences of cartel conduct for businesses, the public, and regulators. The prosecutions
received significant media attention. The vitamins case grew out of the earlier lysine cartel which
was captured on live video thanks to the informant Mark Whitaker, later portrayed in the 2009
motion picture ‘The Informant!’, starring Matt Damon. As US Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Scott Hammond has observed, ‘the prosecution of the vitamin cartel … helped [to]
trigger a rethinking of the adequacy of competition laws around the world.’101
The vitamins cases began with a federal class action complaint in Alabama and a federal
grand jury investigation in Texas. The December 1997 Alabama complaint alleged a conspiracy
among the three major vitamins manufacturers to fix prices and allocate sales.102 In May 1999,
the DOJ announced plea agreements involving major pharmaceutical manufacturer F HoffmannLaRoche Ltd and the German chemical manufacturer BASF Aktiengesellschaft. Stretching more
than nine years, the conspiracy affected more than $5 billion in commerce. The government’s
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sentencing recommendation detailed an ‘extremely well organized operation,’ involving at least
quarterly meetings and once a year meetings among high-level corporate officials to set an
annual ‘budget’, and project global sales volumes and prices. The conspirators’ efforts to conceal
the plot were extensive, including the destruction of most documents after meetings and the
disguising of conspirators’ identities in those documents not destroyed.103
Prosecutions in multiple countries followed the US litigation. In the end, the corporate
cartelists agreed to pay unprecedented fines, globally totaling well over $3 billion (in June 2010
USD). This total breaks down as follows: in the US, $900 million in criminal fines and over $1.1
billion in civil settlements; in the European Union, €790.5 million in fines; in Canada, $94.7
million (Can.) in fines and a $132.2 million national class action settlement; in Australia, $26.5
million (Aus.) in fines and a $30.5 million (Aus.) class action settlement (the first in
Australia);104 in Brazil, R$17.6 million in fines.105
The US DOJ criminally prosecuted twelve corporations and fourteen individuals. Eleven
executives, including six Europeans, went to prison in the US. It was ‘the first time a foreign
executive agreed to serve time in US prison for his participation in an international cartel.’106
While other jurisdictions imposed then-record national fines (Canada, EU, Australia, and Korea,
for example), only the US imposed jail time. Overall, the vitamins prosecution resulted in greater
attention to anti-cartel enforcement around the globe, and spurred the DOJ to increase
international anti-cartel cooperative efforts, as discussed in Part 4.
3.4

EU and EU member state developments

The EU initially tended to follow the US lead in sanctions against international cartels.
The EU’s fines in cases involving the lysine, citric acid, vitamins, sodium gluconate, and
graphite electrodes cartels lagged behind prosecutions in the US by two to five years.107 For
example, the US DOJ announced its first indictment in the citric acid conspiracy in 1996,
whereas the EU announced its decision in that case in 2001.
Over time, however, the EU has steadily become more active in investigating and
sanctioning cartels. Although the EU itself still does not impose a criminal law sanction for cartel
activity, it has been increasingly aggressive in seeking large administrative fines. Many EU
cartel prosecutions involve activity only in EU territory, whereas most of the US cases involve
international or global cartels (that is, cartels involving perpetrators in more than one country, or
foreign cartels whose activities have effects in more than one continent), suggesting two things.
One, that the EU still faces significantly greater cartel activity within its own territory108 and,
two, that the US continues to engage in a more active extraterritorial approach to enforcement,
on the other.
There has been ‘an explosion of enforcement’ against cartels in Europe since the mid1990s, linked once more to the use of leniency programs.109 Over 90% of EU fines against
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cartels have been imposed since 1995.110 The EU overtook the US in 1999 in terms of the
amount of fines imposed. As of 2009, the EU had investigated more than 4,300 companies and
penalized more than 1,550 of them with most penalties paid by European firms.111 And those
figures continue to grow.112 Fines totaled €1.756 billion in 2001 and a record €3.334 billion in
2007. In 2012, the EU secured the highest cartel fine to date: approximately €1.471 billion in
connection with the TV and computer monitor tubes cartel.113 Indeed, the amount in fines
collected by the EU in recent years is many times the amount collected by the Antitrust Division
of the DOJ (although it must be recalled that the DOJ also uses criminal sanctions, and the US
system also includes more extensive private domestic damage suits).114
On 19 May 2010, the EU announced its first settlement under its 2008 settlement
procedure, pursuant to which ten producers of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
chips, agreed to pay a total of € 331,273,800 in fines.115 Participants received a 10% settlement
discount for admitting fault and adhering to settlement procedures. Sixteen settlements have thus
far been reached under the 2008 procedure.116
A few EU member states now impose criminal sanctions against cartels under domestic
law, although a number limit criminal sanctions to the offence of bid rigging. Between October
2005 and December 2009, the Irish competition authority had secured thirty-three criminal
convictions for cartel participants, although no one has gone to jail as the courts have uniformly
suspended the prison sentences.117 This figure includes the first prison sentence in Europe for a
non-bid rigging offense, a six-month suspended sentence for the central figure in a cartel
involving the home heating oil industry.118 Ireland prosecuted a total of twenty-four individuals,
and secured eighteen convictions, in connection with that cartel.119 Although Germany has only
criminalized the offense of bid rigging, it indicted over 260 persons for this offense during the
first eleven years of the statute (between 1998 and 2008), and more than 180 of these individuals
were convicted, many of whom are serving jail time.120 Even in tiny Estonia, authorities initiated
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eight criminal cases in 2009, three of which were referred to the public prosecutor for court
proceedings. Estonia continues to prosecute several cartel cases each year and has been aided by
its adoption of a leniency program in 2010.121
Finally, the United Kingdom (UK) has begun to prosecute cartelists under its 2002
Enterprise Act. The 2007 marine hose prosecution was the first price fixing case brought under
the 2002 law, and resulted in the first criminal sanctions ever imposed for competition law
violations in the United Kingdom. The U.K. sentenced three executives involved in the marine
hose conspiracy to prison terms of thirty, twenty-four, and twenty months, following a US plea
bargain (which made the prosecution much easier and the case thus unique).122 Soon after, in
August 2008, the government charged four current and former British Airways executives with
fixing prices of fuel surcharges for passenger flights.123 That trial, however, collapsed in 2010
after a series of procedural and evidentiary failings on the part of the prosecution.124 Many
commentators view this episode as a severe setback for the criminalization agenda in the UK,
calling into question its viability.125 Wide-ranging reforms to the UK antitrust regime came into
effect in 2014, including the creation of a new competition body and refinements to the
definition of cartel activity that may facilitate future prosecutions.126
3.5

Developments in other countries

Other countries around the world have adopted new competition laws to combat cartels,
reorganized their national competition agencies and devoted more resources to anti-cartel
enforcement. These changes are certainly encouraged, if not catalyzed, by increasing
transgovernmental exchange among national antitrust authorities within a particular normative
framework which portrays global cartel conspirators as evil, contemptuous of the law, and
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exploitative of customers.127 Countries around the world have been attracted by US and EU
enforcement models and successful prosecutions.
Canada has become more active in prosecuting cartel participants, although the
defendants have generally received a suspended sentence so the law has not had nearly the same
bite as that of its North American neighbor. Nonetheless, from 1998 to 2008, Canada convicted
eleven individuals of cartel offenses, nine were required to pay fines (between CDN$10,000 and
CDN$250,000), and the other two received suspended prison sentences. The 2009 amendment to
the Canadian Act creates a per se criminal prohibition against price fixing with a maximum
sentence of fourteen years which could facilitate further criminal prosecutions.128 Indeed, the last
few years have witnessed a steep increase in conduct challenged by the country’s antitrust
enforcer.129 After the amendments came into effect in March 2010, for example, companies
implicated in a polyurethane foam cartel agreed to a fine of CDN$2.5 million, for only five
months of illegal conduct, under the law’s new conspiracy provision.130 In Australia, survey
evidence suggests a majority of that country’s public now views antitrust offenses in moral
terms, following an extensive public-relations campaign by the Australian competition
authority.131 The survey indicates that 42% of the public believe that cartel conduct should be a
crime, and as of 2009 it now is.132 In addition to the fines imposed in connection with the
vitamins cartel, Australian authorities fined six participants in the air transportation cartel in
2008 and initiated proceedings against participants in the marine hose cartel in June 2009.133
Australia has since aggressively pursued civil penalties – securing fines in the tens of millions of
dollars, for example, in connection with a cardboard box and air freight cartel. As of 2015,
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however, the government has not yet initiated a criminal prosecution for cartel conduct under the
new law.134
Overall, Asian cartel enforcement has sharply increased, with approximately triple the
number of investigations initiated in the 2005–2008 period compared to 1995–2004.135 In 2002,
South Korea fined participants in the graphite electrode cartel—the Korea Fair Trade
Commission’s first assessment of fines against an international cartel since its creation in
1981.136 Korea also imposed small fines on three of the sixteen vitamins cartels in 2003.137
Korea’s leniency program is increasingly important; in 2010, the program played a role in 17 of
25 investigations leading to fines.138 In 2007 Japan imposed prison sentences (ranging between
eighteen months and three years) on five executives for bid rigging. The prosecution followed
and was the first based upon a leniency application as part of Japan’s new leniency program.139
Despite this enforcement activity, Asia is still a weak link in international enforcement given the
size of Asian economies and the profit potential for cartels.140
Since 2003, Latin American competition authorities have been increasingly active in anticartel activities, and ‘[b]y nearly all measures, Brazil has the largest and most effective anticartel authority in Latin America.’141 Brazil adopted a ‘National Anti-cartel Strategy’ (ENACC)
in October 2009, as part of its second national Anti-Cartel Enforcement Day, in an effort to
shape social perceptions of cartel activity and public awareness of government anti-cartel
policies.142 The ENACC has since ‘evolved into a network of government and criminal
enforcers, headed by a council created to coordinate administrative investigations and criminal
prosecution.’143 Brazil’s criminal enforcement efforts have been robust. Brazil fines more hardcore cartels annually and imposes higher average corporate cartel fines than any other country in
the region; it is also alone in Latin America in regularly fining cartel managers.144 Brazil fined
participants of the vitamins cartel, and its Secretariat of Economic Law within the Justice
Ministry has prosecuted participants in the air cargo and marine hose cartels.145 Moreover,
Brazilian antitrust authorities have succeeded in reaching a number of settlement agreements – in
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connection with, for example, the marine hose, driving schools, and cement and beef cartels –
pursuant to Brazil’s settlement program adopted in 2007.146 As of mid-2012 more than 250
executives faced criminal penalties for cartel behavior, and the government had sentenced thirtyfour to jail time ranging from two to five years.147
Elsewhere in Latin America, Mexico—which has one of the largest and best-funded
antitrust authorities in Latin America148—fined participants in the citric acid cartel. Although
Mexico’s competition authority has been preoccupied with mergers and monopoly cases, and has
done little to attack cartels,149 this situation could change following passage of a new antitrust
law in 2011 which includes criminal sanctions and more substantial investigatory tools. Focusing
mostly on merger control and abuse of dominance, Argentina’s and Chile’s cartel enforcement
programs are relatively underdeveloped. Argentina generally prosecutes only one or two hardcore cartels per year and imposes negligible fines.150
In the Middle East, Israel has been active in prosecuting cartel offenses, possibly
reflecting closer normative ties to US antitrust policy. Israel secured jail sentences of between
three and nine months for four executives and one economic advisor in its prosecution of a pricefixing and market division cartel involving the floor tile industry.151 Israel’s prosecution of cartel
offenses in the liquefied petroleum gas market led to a plea agreement involving jail sentences
and fines for three defendants, including a prison term for the CEO of one of Israel’s largest gas
distribution companies.152 In more recent cases, Israeli authorities have even arrested executives
implicated in cartel activity at the start of the investigation to prevent the executives from
interfering.153 Egypt’s first criminal cartel prosecution since the creation of its Department to
Protect Competition and Prohibit Monopoly came in early 2008 against twenty cement company
executives. By summer’s end, an Egyptian court convicted the executives, fining them the
equivalent of $1.9 million dollars each for price fixing and agreeing to divide the market.154
4. International cooperation efforts
Transnational initiatives have spurred the diffusion of legal norms regarding cartels and
enforcement techniques to uncover and deter them. Throughout the post-World War II era, the
US has played a central role in global business regulation.155 And so it has since the early 1990s
in the global trend toward strengthening enforcement tools against cartel offenses, including the
addition of criminal sanctions. The global trend coincided with the US DOJ’s aggressive stance
toward international cartels dating from the early 1990s.156 The US efforts were supported by a
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general ideological shift in government attitudes toward market competition following the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989. The US has worked through a number of fora to foster the diffusion of
anti-cartel norms, national institution building to address cartels, and transgovernmental
cooperation efforts. It has worked particularly through the OECD, the ICN, bilateral treaties,
memoranda of understanding, and informal relations.157 The EU and EU member states have
increasingly also played important roles.
4.1

OECD

The OECD has addressed competition issues going back to its Competition Law and
Policy Committee in 1961.158 Much of its efforts related to urging its members to cooperate in
competition matters.159 Its efforts significantly intensified against cartels in 1998 when the
OECD issued its ‘Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action against Hard Core
Cartels’, constituting the first multilateral statement defining and condemning hard core cartels
as pernicious. The OECD condemned ‘hard core cartels’ ‘as the most egregious violations of
competition law.’160 The second report on the Recommendation’s implementation concluded in
similar terms that ‘cartels are unambiguously bad,’ and the third report cited with approval a
2004 US Supreme Court opinion that cartels are the ‘supreme evil of antitrust.’161
Under its anti-cartel program, the OECD sponsors meetings of national authorities,
publishes policy briefs and booklets designed to encourage particular enforcement tools such as
the use of leniency programs (discussed in Part 5.2), collects information on sanctions, and
compiles lists of best practices.162 In parallel, the OECD (complemented by a parallel program in
UNCTAD) issues peer review reports on individual countries’ efforts to detect, investigate, and
prosecute domestic and international cartels.163 It does so with the assistance of the countries’
national authorities who become key intermediaries for the conveyance of global anti-cartel
norms and practices. The peer review process presses them to cast a critical eye on their own
policies, and can provide leverage for them in domestic contests over policy reform. To expand
its reach, the OECD established a broader Global Forum on Competition in 2001, and
established regional competition centers in Eastern Europe and Asia while sponsoring a Latin
American Competition Forum.164
The OECD’s 2005 report on the implementation of its 1998 Recommendation noted
‘aggressive enforcement efforts at very high levels, finding [that] competition authorities in more
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countries than ever bring important cases that resulted in significant sanctions.’165 The report
concluded that ‘more countries are catching up and improving their enforcement regimes in line
with developments in the most advanced jurisdictions,’ and that ‘[c]ooperation among authorities
in investigations of cartels has reached unprecedented levels.’166 The report detailed illustrative
examples of cartel investigations, discussed efforts to raise public awareness of cartel-related
harm, reviewed international efforts to cooperate in investigations and enforcement actions, and
detailed best practices for formal information sharing.167 It stressed, for example, that ‘[m]aking
the public aware of the harm caused by cartels is an important part of a country’s overall effort to
combat cartels,’ including through a ‘strong media relations programme,’ and it pointed to ‘[t]he
programmes developed in Canada and the US’ as ‘good examples of what competition
authorities can do to educate the public.’168 The report noted the particular importance of
‘sanctions against natural persons, placing them at risk individually for their conduct,’ and
included a subsection on ‘A Trend Towards Criminalisation.’169
4.2

ICN

The ICN was created in 2001 under US-instigation following an announcement of
fourteen competition agencies.170 It is a network of competition law officials and nongovernmental advisors who have so far come predominately from the private sector.171 As of
May 2015, the ICN is comprised of 132 national, regional, and other territorial antitrust agencies
operating in 119 jurisdictions, and the list continues to grow.172 It is now the central node for the
diffusion and building of consensus around competition law norms and practices, facilitating the
coordination of transnational regulatory efforts.173 In 2004, the ICN created a Cartel Working
Group. The Working Group’s mandate ‘is to address the challenges of anti-cartel enforcement
across the entire range of ICN members and amongst agencies with differing levels of
experience. At the heart of antitrust enforcement is the battle against hardcore cartels directed at
price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing and market allocations.’ 174 The Working Group
contains sub-groups on legal frameworks and enforcement techniques and has produced (among
other projects) an anti-cartel enforcement manual for its members’ use. Though the OECD did
much of the early work on ‘hard core cartels,’ and continues to be important for policy analysis,
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the ICN has served to diffuse ideas and build relationships among OECD and non-OECD
regulators and practitioners.
The ICN’s aim is to foster ‘procedural and substantive convergence’ of competition law
policy through sustained interaction, capacity building, and the sharing of practices.175 It
facilitates deliberation among national competition authorities regarding preferred approaches to
use against cartels, as well as to sort out differences.176 The ICN produces practical guidance,
such as the Manual on Anti-Cartel Enforcement Techniques, and organizes workshops and
teleseminars, including an annual ICN Cartel Workshop. The Manual on Anti-Cartel
Enforcement Techniques, for example, contains chapters on searches, raids and inspections;
drafting and implementation of effective leniency programs; digital evidence gathering; cartel
case initiation; investigative strategy; and interviewing techniques. In 2005, the Cartel Working
Group published the paper ‘Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective
Penalties’. The paper stresses ‘the significance of the personal liability of the decision-makers,’
and notes that ‘[s]ome agencies also emphasize the effectiveness of criminal sanctions as a
deterrent.’177
The ICN arguably has been successful in contributing to change in legislation and
administrative practice across jurisdictions regarding cartels. ICN member agencies cite the
ICN’s Cartel Enforcement Manual as a crucial tool in developing national cartel enforcement
strategies.178 US Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott Hammond points to the Cartel
Working Group’s annual workshops as particularly useful, providing a venue for anti-cartel
enforcers to meet, learn from one another, and develop working relationships that form the basis
for future cooperation.179 These informal connections, he writes, have led to ‘pick up the phone’
cooperation between competition regulators in different jurisdictions over time.180 The European
Commission estimates that the ICN conducts 90% of its work by teleconference or email.181
Antitrust officials from national agencies around the world have increasingly shared resources
and coordinated investigations, creating a sense of a shared professional enterprise. Coordinated
activity has expanded greatly, including over the timing of raids and the execution of warrants.182
The ICN complements bilateral cooperation among competition agencies and
governments through anti-trust cooperation agreements and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs), which can be used against cartels. The US currently has either a cooperation
agreement or MLAT with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the EU, Germany,
India, Italy, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and the United Kingdom.183 National agencies, for
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example, cooperated successfully to secure plea agreements in connection with the airlines
cartel, and coordinated investigative efforts in connection with the marine hose cartel.184 These
agreements reflect the growing role of international coordination in cartel investigations.
Transnational legal norms are more likely to have impacts where they are clear, coherent,
and deemed legitimate.185 The ICN and OECD provide fora in which networks of national
competition law officials participate. These international initiatives have expanded their access
for officials from jurisdictions around the world. Although the OECD and ICN can be viewed as
rivals, the norms that they have conveyed are coherent, and the documents that codify them are
precise and elaborate.
The officials who participate in the ICN and OECD initiatives act as intermediaries
between the national context and the global one.186 Where they develop professional identities as
competition law enforcers, and where they meaningfully participate in these transnational
processes, they more likely view the documents that emerge from them to represent a legitimate
expression of a transnational policy consensus. In such situations, they are more likely to actively
press for concomitant domestic legal change and engage in enforcement efforts. It is through this
web of global, regional and bilateral networks that anti-cartel enforcement ideas diffuse.
The OECD and ICN are just the most important among transgovernmental and
transnational networks of legal norm diffusion. The broader network of international competition
law and international competition law enforcers includes the UNCTAD that plays an important
role for developing nations, as well as a wide variety of non-governmental and academic
institutions, programs, and events. Non-governmental advisors representing business and
consumer groups, academia, and the legal and economic professions are significantly involved in
these processes, so that the processes are not simply ‘transgovernmental,’ but more broadly
transnational. Diffused common norms through both public and private actors facilitate
transgovernmental coordination, and the practical experience of successful coordination in a
common enterprise, in turn, spurs further normative convergence across and within nation states.
5.

Trends in Enforcement Techniques

Multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts, such as through the ICN, OECD, and
bilateral agreements, have circulated new enforcement tools to combat cartels. We address two,
the facilitation of extradition through the criminalization of cartel activities; and the use of
leniency programs to induce the breakup of cartels.
5.1

Extradition and the Case of Ian Norris
Extradition requires dual criminality.187 This means that the offense at issue must be a
crime in both jurisdictions. One consequence of the criminalization of cartel offenses is that
more countries may extradite individuals for prosecution in other jurisdictions. The jurisdiction
most likely seeking such extradition and most likely to imprison individuals is the US. If
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extradition to the US becomes easier, decisions for participants in cartels about international
business travel become more complex.
In March 2010, Ian Norris became the first foreign national extradited to the US to face
charges stemming from an antitrust investigation.188 Norris obstructed the DOJ’s investigation
into a carbon components manufacturing cartel in which he participated. In November 2002, UK
industrial manufacturer Morgan Crucible and its US subsidiary Morganite admitted to
wrongdoing in connection with a price-fixing conspiracy. Norris headed Morgan Crucible during
a part of the conspiracy and throughout the cover-up. The US indicted him on both counts, and
alleged that his offenses were flagrant. He was found to have assembled a document-destruction
task force whose sole purpose was to destroy evidence of the price-fixing conspiracy. That task
force created a script, designed to mislead investigators, for use by Morgan-entity executives
questioned about the conspiracy. After the DOJ investigation became public, Norris instructed
his co-conspirators to use the script if questioned about the illicit meetings.
The DOJ’s attempt to extradite Norris to the US initially failed. The House of Lords held
in 2008 that price-fixing was not a crime at the time in question (as it is now in the UK), and thus
the dual criminality requirement of the US-UK extradition treaty was not satisfied. The House of
Lords nonetheless remanded the case on the question of whether extradition for obstruction of
justice was proper. The lower courts rejected Norris’s argument that extradition would violate
the European Convention on Human Rights in view of his (and his wife’s) age and poor health—
a result unanimously affirmed on appeal by the UK Supreme Court (which in 2009 assumed the
role of court of final resort from the House of Lords). The European Court of Human Rights
rejected his appeal on human rights grounds in February of 2010. On March 23, 2010, the UK
extradited Norris to the US to stand trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.189 A federal jury
convicted him of conspiring to obstruct justice on July 27, 2010,190 and in December 2010 a
judge sentenced him to eighteen months in a US prison.191
The Norris extradition has not proved to be a one-off event. In 2014, a former marine hose
executive was extradited from Germany to face charges of participating in a worldwide bidrigging conspiracy making this the first extradition for a direct antitrust crime, rather than the
obstruction of justice charges in the Norris case. Extraditions will likely become more
commonplace as a growing number of countries criminalize cartel activity. As a result, avoiding
travel to the US may no longer be sufficient to insulate cartel members from the prospect of
spending time in a US prison. Even short of extradition, growing criminalization means
substantial travel restrictions and the use of border controls and Interpol to monitor the location
of defendants and fugitives.192
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5.2

Leniency Programs

Antitrust officials point to the proliferation, convergence and coordination of leniency
provisions to destabilize cartels as another major development in anti-cartel enforcement around
the world. Leniency programs generally provide immunity to the first cartelist to admit liability
and cooperate with authorities, with the aim of creating a ‘race to confess.’ 193 They are used as a
carrot to complement the stick of enhanced sanctions, such as criminalization or substantial
fines. In some ways, they can be viewed as ‘a motor of penal expansion,’ as leniency becomes
more attractive when the alternative of sanctions becomes more threatening.194 The program was
first developed in the US and has been zealously used there. Gary Spratling, former US Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for cartel prosecution, reports that the use of leniency is linked to
90% of US cartel fines imposed since 1997.195
The US has aggressively sought to promote leniency programs, and the ICN has
publicized procedures to aid national competition agencies in implementing them. In 1990, only
the US had a leniency program on the books. Today around 60 jurisdictions do,196 including
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, the EU, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, South
Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK.197 The DOJ’s Hammond thus describes this
phenomenon as ‘the single most significant development in cartel enforcement.’198 The diffusion
of leniency programs as an anti-cartel enforcement tool again attests to the normative power of
the US model diffused through the ICN.
Nonetheless, some might question whether the parallel trend toward global
criminalization should enhance or hamper the effectiveness of leniency programs.199 While
Hammond rightly stresses that the threat of harsh sanctions in a jurisdiction should induce cartel
members to seek immunity, the cartel participant must also be wary of potential sanctions in
other jurisdictions where the cartel’s activities have transnational effects. Where the potential
sanction in another jurisdiction is penal, the participant’s decision may become more
complicated, especially in light of institutional divergences for enforcing criminal sanctions and
administering amnesty and leniency programs in different jurisdictions so that decisions may lie
outside the control of a national antitrust authority.200
6. Impediments to Implementation: Social Norms and Institutional Structures
Notwithstanding the expansion of criminal provisions and the increasingly robust
enforcement of cartel prohibitions around the world, actual enforcement will face severe
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practical limits in most jurisdictions. The implementation of transnational legal norms will
ultimately depend on local factors, and in particular, domestic political and social attitudes
regarding cartel behavior, and domestic institutional structures, capacities and legacies.201
Cultural attitudes may be the single biggest hurdle to enforcement trends. Not all
members of the public are convinced that cartel offenses merit the criminal penalty of jail time,
which is advocated most vocally by the US. Criminalization implicates moral judgments that
vary with socio-cultural context. US antitrust law has long exhibited a moral dimension, which
facilitates the use of criminal sanctions against individuals in cartel cases.202 In contrast, ‘there
appears to be (at least outside North America) no strong feeling on the part of the wider public
about the inherent criminality of price fixing and like practices.’203 National competition
authorities outside of North America recognize this uphill battle and thus view public education
about the evils of cartel offenses as a central component of their missions.204 Presentations in
October 2010 by competition authorities from Australia and Japan at the ICN’s Cartel Workshop
in Yokohama, Japan reflect this concern.205 The 2010 ICN survey extensively reports ‘factors
influencing perception of importance of cartel enforcement.’206 To the extent that public opinion
supporting criminalization is lacking in many jurisdictions, the transnational trend can be
understood as more of a top-down than a bottom-up process. As a result, the impact at the time
of implementation could be limited.
Another significant hurdle is institutional, involving particular institutional heritages,
structures, and capacity challenges. Jurisdictions in Europe and Asia that have an institutional
heritage of using administrative agencies that apply administrative fines against enterprises, as
opposed to criminal sanctions against individuals, are unlikely to change significantly, at least in
the short term. In addition, for most jurisdictions, criminal law enforcement involves a separate
institution from cartel enforcement, creating institutional coordination challenges. A competition
agency may wish to retain its monopoly on enforcement, and public prosecutors may not trust
competition authorities. In contrast, the US entrusts both civil and criminal enforcement against
cartels to a specialized division within the DOJ, which has created a particular institutional
legacy that facilitates the use of criminal sanctions. Also, many competition systems are in their
infancy and lack institutional capacity. Competition law is particularly recent in China and
Egypt, for example, and it has recently undergone a major overhaul in states such as Brazil,
India, and Mexico. Finally, there are jurisdiction-specific disincentives, such as constitutional
and evidentiary hurdles, which complicate the pursuit of aggressive enforcement.207 In sum, both
institutional legacies and political and social attitudes toward cartels will affect the application of
anti-cartel law in practice, especially as regards criminalization. In many cases, we are skeptical
that enforcement practice will meaningfully follow the spread of formal legal policies.
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7. Conclusion
Countries in every region of the world, including virtually all of the world’s leading
economies, have significantly enhanced sanctions and, in a growing number of cases,
criminalized cartel offenses, often only recently. Many states have initiated prosecutions, several
have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time for these offenses. The US DOJ has
played a central role as a unilateral enforcer against international cartels, as a collaborator with
other national competition agencies in enforcement, and as an anti-cartel advocate in
international fora. International venues such as the ICN now play an important role in offering
guidance to national competition agencies, and in providing a forum for policy deliberation,
information sharing, cooperation, and professional socialization. Harry First, former Chief of
New York state’s Antitrust Bureau, goes so far as to declare that we already ‘have international
‘law’ [against cartels] without ever having adopted one at the international level.’208
Since criminal law lies at the heart of state sovereignty, the global trend toward
criminalization of cartel offenses is quite remarkable. Yet the criminalization and enforcement
records outside the US are hardly uniform. Given the novelty of legal changes in so many
countries, and the challenges of institutional capacity for many, we are skeptical regarding actual
enforcement in many countries that have formally adopted enhanced sanctions. Even in states
that have criminalized cartel offenses, lingering questions remain about the propriety of
criminalization and imprisonment. Much of the criminalization trend thus appears to be a product
of transnational enforcement interests more than of domestic bottom-up processes. While
countries appear to be moving toward convergence on enhanced sanctions, including criminal
penalties against individuals, national competition agencies outside of North America are—to
borrow from Harold Koh—grappling with the task of bringing home transnational legal norms
and practices for combating cartels.209
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TABLE 1: Criminalization of Cartel Conduct by Country,
Listed Chronologically
Country

Datei of
Criminalization of
Cartel Activities

Canada1

1889

United
States2

1890 (became a
felony in 1974)

Italy3

1930*

Poland4

1932*

Japan5

Norway8

1947 (amended in
2005 to give
investigatory
powers)
1953 (became
primarily civil in
1986)
1959* (originally
criminalized all hard
core cartels, in 2002
decriminalized
except for bid
rigging)
1960

Israel9

1961

France6
Austria7

Serious
About Using
Criminal
Laws?ii
Yes (became
more active
in late 1990s)
Yes (became
more active
in 1990s)

Yes (became
more active
in early
1990s)
No

Criminal finesiii

Imprison
mentiv

Date of
Competition Law

Max. CDN$25 million

Max. 14
years

1889 (new law in
1986)

Corporation Max. US$100
million or twice the gain
from the illegal conduct or
twice the loss to the victims;
Individual Max. US$1
million
Min. € 103,00
Max. € 1032,00

Max. 10
years

1890

Min. 3
months
Max. 5
years
Max. 3
years
Max. 5
years

1990

Administrative fines only

1990 (new law in
2007)
1947

Yes (became
more active
recently)

Max. 5 million yen

No

Max. €75,000

Max. 4
years

1945 (new laws in
1986 and 2001)

No

Administrative fines only

Max. 3
years

1951 (new laws in
1984 and 2005)

Yes (became
more active
in the 1980s)
Yes (became
more active
in late 1990s)

Amount of criminal fines not
specified

Max. 6
years

1926 (new laws in
1993 and 2004)

Corporation Max. NIS 4
million plus NIS 28,000 for
each day offence persists;

Max. 5
years

1959 (new law in
1988)

i

All years are based upon the date the law was enacted
A country is deemed to meet this standard if it has prosecuted individuals under their criminal law, or, in the event
that it has only recently criminalized cartel conduct, it has stressed that it is its intention to do so. This category
involves, in part, a subjective judgment.
iii
All criminal fines are based upon penalties in the current law
iv
All terms of imprisonment are based upon penalties in the current law
ii
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Individual Max. NIS 2
million plus NIS 14,000 for
each day such offence
persists.
Min. fine of 1 year
(percentage of income
determined by judge)
Max. fine of 2 years

Min. 1
year
Max. 3
years

1963 (new laws in
1989 and 2007)

Spain10

1973 (revision in
1995 separating
general cartels and
bid rigging)

No

Greece11

1977 (initially
provided for
imprisonment but
later abolished and
reinstated in 2009)
1980

Yes

Min. €100,000
Max. €1,000,000

Min. 2
years

1977 (new law in
2011)

Yes (became
more active
in 2008)
No

Max. KRW 200 million

Max. 3
years

1980

Max. KES 10 million

Max. 5
years
Min. 2
years
Max. 5
years
Max. 3
years
(but only
if repeat
offender)
Max. 6
years

1988 (new law in
2010)
1962 (new laws in
1990, 1991, and
1994)

Max. 6
years
Max. 5
years

1991 (new laws in
1994 and 2001)
1994 (new law in
2010)

Min. 6
months
Max. 5
years

1993 (new law in
2008)

Max. 10
years

1953 (new laws in
1991 and 2002)

Min. 6
months
Max. 3
years

1996

South
Korea12
Kenya13

1988

Brazil14

1990

Yes (became
more active
post-2003)

Min. 1/30 minimum wage
Max. 1,800 times minimum
wage

Taiwan15

1991 (amended in
1999 to only
criminalize repeat
offenders)

No

Max. TWD 100 million (but
only if repeat offender)

Iceland16

1993

Amount of criminal fines not
specified

Slovakia17

1993

Yes (became
more active
in late 2000s)
No

Zambia18

1994

No

Slovenia19

1995 (major revision
was made to
criminal law in 2008
but no prosecution
to date)

No

Ireland20

1996

Yes

Max. 500,000 penalty units
(1 penalty unit is currently
K180)
Corporation Min. €50,000
Max. 200 times damage
caused or illegal gain
obtained
Individual Min. 30 days of
salary
Max. 500 days of salary
Max. €4 million or 10% of
revenue

Romania21

1996

No

Administrative fines only

Min. 500 Max. 30,000
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1993 (new law in
2005)
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Russia22

1996

Denmark23

1997**

Yes (became
more active
in 2010)
No

Germany24

1997*

Yes

Indonesia25

1999

No

Thailand26

1999

No

Barbados27

2002

No

Corporation Max. BBD
500,000; Individual Max.
BBD 150,000 (only
imposed if fail to end
cartel after warning)

Estonia28

2002

Yes

Corporation:
Max. €16 million or 10% of
revenue; Individual Min. 30
days of salary

Max. RUR 1 million or 5
years of salary

Max. 7
years

1991 (new law in
2006)

Amount of criminal fines not
specified
None

None

1937 (new laws in
1990 and 1997)
1923 (new law in
1958)
1999

Min. Rp. 25 billion
Max. Rp. 100 billion
Max. THB 6 million

Max. 5
years
Max. 6
months
Max. 3
years
Max. 6
months
(only if
fail to
end after
warning)
Max. 3
years

1979 (new law in
1999)
2002

1993 (new laws in
1998 and 2001)

Max. 500 days of salary
United
Kingdom29
Hungary30

2002

Yes

Unlimited fines

2005*

No

Administrative only

Australia31

2009

Yes

Czech
Republic32

2009

Yes

Corporation Max. AUS$ 10
million or 3 times the gain
from the illegal conduct or,
if that gain cannot be
defined, 10% of revenue;
Individual
Max. AUS$220,000
Amount of criminal fines
depends on damages

South
Africa33
Mexico34

2009***

Yes

Max. R 500,000

2011

Yes

Min. 1,000 days of salary
Max. 3,000 days of salary

Max. 5
years
Max. 5
years
Max. 10
years

1948 (new laws in
1998 and 2002)
1990 (new law in
1996)
1906 (new laws in
1965, 1971, 1974,
and 2010)

Min. 2
years
Max. 8
years
Max. 10
years
Min. 3
years
Max. 10
years

1991 (new law in
2001)

1955 (new laws in
1979 and 1998)
1924 (new laws in
1992 and 2011)

* These countries have limited criminalization of cartel activity to bid rigging in public tenders.
This Table provides an entry point for understanding the state of criminalization in countries.
While we note those countries that criminalize only bid rigging, the Table does not break down
countries in terms of whether the criminal offense focuses specifically on cartels or more broadly
on competition law violations. The Table also does not note countries that have completely
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decriminalized cartel violations, such as Finland, although the footnotes provide information as
to countries which have decriminalized cartels except for bid rigging, such as Germany. The
Table also does not note those jurisdictions where fines are formally administrative (and not
criminal), but where their stringency can arguably be viewed as punitive and thus penal in
practice, such as the European Union, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands.
** The countries only impose criminal fines and do not imprison violators.
*** South Africa passed legislation to criminalize cartel activity in 2009 but it has not yet gone
into force because of Presidential inaction.
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1

Canada was the first country to criminalize cartels. See: Julian M Joshua and others, ‘Extradition and Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties: Cartel Enforcement's Global Reach’ (2008) 75 Antitrust law Journal 353, 378. Canada has
frequently amended its Competition Act throughout the years. The first jail sentence did not take place until 1996.
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/00960.html. In 2009 the Act was amended by creating
a per se criminal prohibition against agreements between competitors to fix prices.
http://www.dwpv.com/images/Anti-Cartel_Enforcement_in_Canada_-_Still_More_Bark_Than_Bite.pdf.
For the current Act see: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00148.html.
2
The United States criminalizes cartels both under the Sherman Act, and under state statues. See:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4131.pdf. Violations of the Act were originally only a
misdemeanor, but in 1974 Congress made violations a felony. See:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00574.x/abstract. The US DOJ
first became increasingly more active in using criminal law in the 1990s. For the modern Act see:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00000001----000-.html.
3
Article 353 of the Italian Criminal Code, adopted on October 19, 1930, criminalizes any colluding activity which
may affect the result of public tender procedures. Bid rigging crimes, particularly in the construction industry,
have been vigorously prosecuted since the Clean Hands political corruption scandal in the early 1990s. Email from
Giulio Cesare Rizza of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP law firm to author ( 21 June 2011). See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4111.pdf; and ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
Competition Laws Outside the United States, 2D 2011.
4
For the Polish Act on Competition and Consumers, see: http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download.php?plik=7618.
Article 305 of the Polish Criminal Code criminalizes bid rigging in public tenders. See:
http://km.undp.sk/uploads/public/File/AC_Practitioners_Network/Poland_Penal_Code.pdf (1997 version in
English). For the current version of the Penal Code in Polish see:
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/10. See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=171&chapters_id=4119; and
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/29/34720956.pdf. Bid rigging was first criminalized in the 1932 Criminal Code
in Article 283. Email from Ewa Gojniczek of WKB Wiercinski, Kwiecinski, Baehr law firm, July 25, 2011
5
In 2005 the Japanese Antimonopoly Monopoly Act was amended to give compulsory investigatory powers to the
Free Trade Commission. See Mitsuo Matsushito, ‘Reforming the Enforcement of the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law’ (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Review 521; http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/18/33723798.pdf;
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/18/33723798.pdf. In 2009, Japan criminally convicted six former executives for
cartel offenses. Also in 2009, Japan increased the maximum prison sentence for unfair restrictions from three
years to five years. See: http://www.omm.com/newsroom/publication.aspx?pub=865. For the Japanese Law
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, see
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/index.html. For a good concise overview of the cartel landscape in
Japan, see http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/cartels-and-leniency/cartels-&-leniency-2013/japan.
6
In France, enforcement under the competition acts of 1953 and 1958 were exclusively criminal. The laws were
reformed in 1977 and again in 1986 which introduced the present French system which relies mostly on
administrative sanctions; however, criminal sanctions are still available. See:
http://www.pspe.org.pl/dokumenty/137_IsCriminalizationofEUCompetitionLawtheAnswer.pdf.
For the Commercial Code see: http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3096. The statute of
limitations was extended in 2001, theoretically making it more feasible to criminally prosecute cartel cases.
See: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/60/31415943.pdf. See also:
http://www.pspe.org.pl/dokumenty/137_IsCriminalizationofEUCompetitionLawtheAnswer.pdf; ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, Competition Laws Outside the United States, 2D 2011.
7
Section 168b of the Austrian Criminal Code criminalizes bid rigging; however, before the Competition Law was
amended in 2002 Austria could impose criminal penalties for other cartel conduct. See:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4095.pdf. According to a general provision, section 37, a fine
could be placed instead of the prison sentence for bid rigging. For the Criminal Code (in German) see:
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002296.
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8

Typical maximum imprisonment in Norway is 3 years; however, the maximum becomes 6 years for aggregating
circumstances. In practice, authorities have only applied fines. For the Competition Act of 2004 see:
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/The-Competition-Act-of-2004/.
For the Competition Act of 1993 see: http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/The-Competition-Act-of1993/. An Act to Control Monopolistic Practices and Unwarranted Prices of 1926, see: ANTI-TRUST LAWS 281 (W.
Friedman ed., 1956).
9
While there were a few criminal cases in the early 1980s, the Israeli Antitrust Law (both the 1959 and 1988
version) was not significantly enforced until the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) was created in 1994. See:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/37/2488835.pdf. In the early 2000s the IAA went further by requesting the court
to impose actual imprisonment, which the court imposed against the tile cartel. Email from Mazor Matzkevich of
Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co. Law Offices, July 10, 2011.The amount of criminal charges and the severity of
the punishments increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s. See:
http://www.fbclawyers.com/FileServer/979d371dcfce94ade7ce2277174b2106.pdf.
The typical maximum imprisonment is 3 years unless certain defined aggravating factors are present, in which case
the maximum is 5 years. For the Restrictive Trade Practices Law see: http://engarchive.antitrust.gov.il/ANTSearchItems.aspx?Subject=100209. See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4110.pdf.
10
Additionally, debarment and a general prohibition to contract with public administrations of between 3 and 5 years
can be imposed. For the Spanish Competition Act, see:
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/GestionDocumental/tabid/76/Default.aspx?EntryId=18425&Command=Core
_Download&Method=attachment. Article 262 of the Spanish Penal Code criminalizes bid rigging in auctions and
public tenders. Article 284 of the Spanish Penal Code criminalizes other types of cartels. For the Spanish Penal
Code (in Spanish) see:
http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/1292345163509?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Con
tentDisposition&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3DCriminal_Code_%28C%C3%B3digo_Penal%29.P
DF. See also: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3365.pdf and JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD
LAW OF COMPETITION OVERVIEW § 1.15[1] (1987).
11
Greece recently enacted a new Competition Act (Law 3959/2011) which replaced Law 703/1977, and which
created stiffer sentences focused on cartel offenses. For the new law (in Greek) see:
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/bcc26661-143b-4f2d-8916-0e0e66ba4c50/p-proant-pap.pdf. The
previous Competition Act (Law 703/1977) provided for criminal fines. The initial text of the 1977 law also
provided for imprisonment (of at least three months) for cartel violations, but (to our knowledge) no one was ever
sentenced under it, and it was subsequently abolished until the sanction of imprisonment was re-introduced in
August 2009 (Law 3784/2009 amending once again Law 703/1977. See also:
http://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/ConsolidatedGreekCompetitionLaw.pdf;
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/02_2011/el_act.pdf; and
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4107.pdf.
12
In 1999, the Korean Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act removed legal exemptions for 20 cartels. See:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/44/2497300.pdf. While civil penalties have become increasingly common,
criminal enforcement is still relatively rare. See: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4113.pdf. In
2008, the Korean Free Trade Commission (KFTC) began to forward cartel offenders to the Korean Prosecutor's
Office for criminal prosecution. See: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm#N_35_. The Korean
Supreme Court has ruled that the KFTC must first recommend criminal charges to the Prosecutors Office for such
charges to be valid. See:
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/AT307000/otherlinks_files/at307000_newsletter_201103.pdf.
For the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act see:
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/static/Legal_Authority/Monopoly%20Regulation%20and%20Fair%20Trade%20Act_Aug
%203%202007.pdf.
13
For the Kenyan Competition Act 2010 see:
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/CompetitionAct_No12of2010_.doc. For the
Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act 1988 see:
http://www.treasury.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&Itemid=54&gid=68&orderby=dmdat
e_published&ascdesc=DESC. See also: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/44/1832315.pdf.
14
While the Brazilian Antitrust Law was originally passed in 1994, it was amended and strengthened both in 2000
and 2007. Brazilian competition authorities did not begin to focus on anti-cartel enforcement until 2003.
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For the Brazilian Antitrust Law see: http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document_center/legislation/brazilian-antitrustlaw.pdf. See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=171&chapters_id=4097;
http://www.heinonline.org.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/HOL/Page?page=929&handle=hein.journals/antibull40&collection=j
ournals; and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/45154362.pdf.
15
The current Taiwanese Competition Law only allows for criminal punishment for repeat offenders. For the Fair
Trade Act of 2010, see: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=644&docid=11057.
The Fair Trade Act of 1992 (enacted in 1991) allowed for the same criminal punishments to non-repeat offenders.
See: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=644&docid=1555. For the Fair Trade Act of
1999, see: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=644&docid=1554. See
also: http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgram2003/LINGin.pdf; and http://www.worldservicesgroup
.com/publications.asp?action=article&artid=1709. Taiwan introduced a leniency program in 2011 and announced
its first decision under the program in late 2012. See
http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/71263/competition-law-developments-in-east-asia-september2012.
16
For the Icelandic Competition Law No. 44/2005 see: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190678.
For the Competition Law No. 8/1993 see:
http://www.idnadarraduneyti.is/log-og-reglugerdir/Allar_Reglugerdir/nr/102. See also:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/31/2404778.pdf.
17
The normal maximum punishment is three years in prison; however, if a competitor suffers serious damage then
the penalty is two to six years of prison. See Section 250 of Penal Code (in Slovakian):
http://www.zbierka.sk/Dokumenty/Download/37/Default.aspx.
For the Slovak Act on Protection of Competition see: http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/Act%20136-2001novela-aj.rtf. To date, no criminal charges have been brought by Slovakia’s authorities. See:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4122.pdf.
18
The Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2010 per se criminalizes all horizontal agreements. See:
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=714.
For The Competition and Fair Trading Act of 1994 see:
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Zambia/COMPETITION%20anDFAIR%20TRADING%2
0ACT.PDF. For an explanation about the fine system see: http://www.zra.org.zm/Penalties.php.
19
Cartels in Slovenia were originally incriminated in 1995 when the Criminal Code was enacted; however, the
effectiveness was diminished because of its poor definition. In 2008, a new Criminal Code was enacted which
substantially amended the wording to its current form in Article 225. See:
http://www.policija.si/eng/images/stories/Legislation/pdf/CriminalCode2009.pdf. To our knowledge, no one has
been criminally prosecuted for a hard core offense, although in 2010 the Competition Protection Office provided
documents to the state prosecutor regarding a cartel of Slovenian operators of ski lifts accused of fixing the prices
of ski tickets for ten years. Email from Tjaša Lahovnik of Odvetniki Šelih & partnerji law firm, June 21, 2011. For
the Slovenian Act on the Prevention of the Restriction of Competition see:
http://www.uvk.gov.si/fileadmin/uvk.gov.si/pageuploads/ZPOmK__neuradno_precisceno_besedilo__-_ang.pdf.
See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=171&chapters_id=4123.
20
The Irish Competition Act of 2002 increased maximum fines and imprisonment. See:
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2002/en/act/pub/0014/print.html#partii-sec11. See also:
http://www.calvani.com/TerrysFiles/Articles/Irish%20Cartel%20Enforcement-Fordham%202004.pdf; and
http://www.tara.tcd.ie/bitstream/2262/11978/1/LyonsP0507.pdf. In 2006, Ireland became the first EU country to
impose a prison sentence for a cartel activity besides bid rigging. See: http://www.efc.ie/fullpublications.php?id_publications=99. At the end of 2010, there had been 33 criminal convictions (18 undertakings
and 15 individuals) for hard core cartel offenses. See:
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2010%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
For the Competition Act of 1996 see: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/plwebcgi/fastweb?state_id=1270120620&view=agview&numhitsfound=1&query_rule=%28%28$query3%29%29%3Alegtitle&query3=Competition%20%28Amen
dment%29%20Act%201996&docid=53018&docdb=Acts&dbname=Acts&dbname=SIs&sorting=none&operator=
and&TemplateName=predoc.tmpl&setCookie=1. In July 2012, amendments to the Competition Act came into
force that, inter alia, doubled potential prison time to ten years.: Peter Whelan, ‘Ireland Offers a Glimmer of Hope
for European Cartel Criminalisation’ (Competition Policy Blog, 26 July 26 2012)
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http://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/07/26/ireland-offers-a-glimmer-of-hope-for-european-cartelcriminalisation/.
21
The Romanian Competition Law criminalizes actions with a “fraudulent intent and in a decisive way” and calls
for punishment in the form of either imprisonment or criminal fines. See Article 63:
http://www.competition.ro/documente/en/l21_1996_mod.pdf. A new Criminal Code has been enacted but the date
for its entry has not gone into force as of July 22, 2011. The new Code will change criminal fines from its current
form listed in the table above to a minimum of 180 fine-days and a maximum of 300 fine-days (a fine-day may
range from RON 10-500). Email from Georgeta Harapcea of Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Peterse law firm
July 22, 2011.
Also, see: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4121.pdf;
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/documente/Raport%202010%20final_19510ro.pdf; and
ROMANIA IN TRANSITION 176 (Lavinia Stan ed. 1997).
22
In 2010, Russian officials began criminal proceeding against a large coal cartel. See:
http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_31148.html. For a copy of the On Protection of Competition Act see:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.gov.ru
%2Ffiles%2F8955%2FLAW_On_Protection_of_Competition__Eng_1.doc&rct=j&q=On%20Protection%20of%2
0Competition%20russia&ei=lJflTcDIKoWXtwfm1LDeCQ&usg=AFQjCNGgtEGHZuUXE7vYLMZuavAnHCL
Gsw&cad=rja.
See also: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3361.pdf.
23
The Danish Competition Act refers to Part 10 of the Criminal Code which lays out general guidelines for judges
imposing criminal fines which (for our purposes) apply to agreements in violation of EU and Danish competition
law. See:
http://www.konkurrencestyrelsen.dk/fileadmin/webmasterfiles/konkurrence/Fusionskontrol/Consolidated_Act_No.
_1027_of_21_August_2007_as_amended_as_of_1_October_2010.pdf. See also:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/18/34767708.pdf; http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/culture/papers/iversen09.pdf;
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=126&chapters_id=3307; and
JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION OVERVIEW § 1.09][1] (1987).
24
In 1997, Section 298 was added to the German Criminal Code which specifically criminalized bid rigging in
tender proceedings. See: http://www.antitrust.de/. Before that, in 1992, the criminal courts had begun applying the
general fraud provision to bid rigging cartels.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584887http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1
584887From 1998 to 2008, there were over 260 indictments and 180 convictions for bid rigging. See:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584887. For the Act Against Restraints of Competition see:
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GWB.htm. See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3317.pdf; and
http://www.jstor.org.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/stable/1891098.
25
The Indonesian Law on Prohibition Against Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition calls for
criminal fines or imprisonment in lieu of fines. See: http://www.cipatent.com/unfairlaw.pdf. See also:
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/csis/publications/Oct18.pdf; and http://eng.kppu.go.id/wpcontent/uploads/2010/04/performance_report_2009.pdf.
26
Thai authorities have recently discussed overhauling the Competition Act because it has been criticized as
ineffective. See: http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8608&nid=6; and
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/Competition-law.html. For the Act see:
http://gis.dit.go.th/otcc/upload/TradeAct.pdf. See also: http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/b29ae69fc3d2-484f-9b5a-49bde68ad16b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a5dd9d43-9f25-4ea1-97aa4c90a362d5b0/Thai_Competition_Law.pdf.
27
The Barbados Fair Competition Act states that the Fair Trade Commission must notify the parties whose
agreement or trade practice is anticompetitive before prosecution. Only if a person fails to terminate the offending
action may penalties be imposed,
http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.
bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?optio
n=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&ta
sk=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&i
d=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89ht
tp://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.b
b/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option
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=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&tas
k=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89. For the Act, see: http://www.ftc.gov.bb/library/CAP326C.pdf.
28
Section 400 of the Estonian Penal Code, which imposes criminal sanctions for actions preventing free
competition, was enacted in 2002 and amended in 2010. From 2008 to 2009, 14 criminal procedures were brought
against hard core cartels. See: http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/Annual_Report_2009.pdf;
and http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?14445. For the Competition Act, see:
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/competition_act_july_2006.pdf. See also:
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3309.pdf;http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/
Annual_Report_2009.pdfhttp://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/Annual_Report_2009.pdf.
29
The British Enterprise Act makes it a criminal offence only if an individual dishonestly agrees with one or more
other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements between at least two
undertakings involving any of the following: price fixing, market sharing, limiting supply or production, and bid
rigging. See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents; http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/legalpowers/legal/competition-act-1998/; http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4130.pdf; and
http://ld.practicallaw.com/2-504-4903#a996632..
30
In 2005, Article 296/B was added to the Hungarian Criminal Code, criminalizing cartels in public procurement
procedures and concession tenders. See: http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/hu/hu019en.pdf.
For the Hungarian Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Prices 1997 see:
http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&st=2&pg=129&m5_doc=4244&m176_act=2.
For the Act LXXXVII of 1990 on Price Setting see:
http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/pdf/Jogi_Magyar_Egyeb_torveny_Artorveny_a.pdf
See also: http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=126&chapters_id=3320;
and http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mjil15&div=30&g_sent=1&collection=journals.
31
For the Australian Competition and Consumer Act see: http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/overview.html.
See also: http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/legislation/1906aipa.html; and
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4094.pdf.
32
In 2009, the Czech Criminal Code was revised and added Article 248, making participation in a cartel an explicit
criminal offense. See: http://www.schoenherr.eu/newspublications/pdfs/schoenherr%20public%20competition%20enforcement%20review%20czechrepublic; and
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=126&chapters_id=3306.
Imprisonment is available only if the damage or profit of the acting person was above 5 Mio CZK or the cartel led
to the insolvency of a third party. Email from Arthur Braun of Braun law firm July 4, 2011. The Criminal Code
(1961) Article 127 had generally criminalized breach of business rules and could have applied to competition
laws; however, it was never used to convict someone who violated competition laws. See:
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=77290.
33
The South African Competition Amendment Act was amended in 2009 to include criminal liability; however, the
Act provides that the President can determine when it enters into force, and as of the close of 2012, it has not yet
come into force. See: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4124.pdf.
34
Article 234 of Mexico’s current Competition Law criminalizes cartels. See:
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Leyes/compendio2011conreformas.pdf; and
http://www.mexico.vg/mexicos-economy/calderon-competition-law/4500. The 1857 Mexican Constitution
contained a provision which banned monopolies. Antitrust statues were first passed in 1924, 1931, and 1934. See:
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Competition Laws Outside the United States, 2D 2011.
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